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Abstract 
 
Dendritic cells are antigen  presenting cells that provide a vital  link between  the innate and adaptive immune system, 
providing   the initial   detection of pathogenic invaders.   Research   into  this  family  of  cells  has  revealed  that they 
perform  information  fusion which directs  immune  responses.  We have derived a Dendritic Cell Algorithm based  on 
the  functionality of these  cells, by  modelling  the  biological  signals  and  differentiation  pathways to  build  a control  
mechanism for an artificial  immune  system. We present algorithmic details  in addition to experimental results, when 
the  algorithm was applied  to anomaly detection for the  detection of port  scans. The  results  show the  Dendritic Cell 
Algorithm  is successful at detecting port  scans. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Denritic   Cells  (DCs)  are  natural anomaly   de- 
tectors.  In this  paper  we present a Dendritic  Cell 
Algorithm  (DCA)  approach  to information fusion, 
combining  key  elements  of immunological  theory 
with  the  engineering  principles  of data  fusion.  In 
the  human  immune  system,  DCs  have  the  power 
to suppress  or activate  the immune system  by cor- 
relation  of signals  representing  their  environment, 
combined  with  locality markers  in the  form of an- 
tigens.  Antigens  are  proteins  in structure and  are 
any protein  to  which  the  immune  system  can  po- 
tentially  respond. These cells are responsible for the 
detection  of pathogens in the human  body through 
the  correlation  of information (in the  form of mo- 
lecular  signals)  within  the  environment.  By using 
an  abstraction of DC behaviour,  similar  detection 
properties  are  shown,  resulting   in  an  algorithm 
capable  of performing  anomaly  detection.  The res- 
ultant algorithm uses a set of weights derived or the 
processing of input signals from actual immunolo- 
gical data,  generated through an  interdisciplinary 
collaboration with immunologists[32]. 
DCs in particular are suitable  as inspiration  for 
intrusion detection  for two reasons. Firstly,  DCs 
themselves   perform   an   intrusion   detection  role 
within the human immune system. Secondly, DCs 
perform  their  function  with  low rates  of false pos- 
itives  and  high rates  of true positives  - properties 
essential to any anomaly detection technique. In 
essence, DCs are multisensor data fusion agents 
through   processing  environmental  molecular   sig- 
nals. This makes them ideal inspiration for the 
development of a data  fusion algorithm. 
The  DCA  was  introduced  in  2005[9] and  has 
demonstrated potential as a classifier for static 
machine  learning  data  [9],  as  a  simple  port  scan 
detector  under  experimental conditions[11] and  in 
real time[10]. Our  results  show that the  DCA can 
successfully  detect   anomalous   processes  forming 
a  port scan  attack.   The  DCA  is inspired  by  the 
human  immune  system  and  is termed  an artificial 
immune  system  (AIS).  While  the  majority of AIS 
algorithms do  not  perform  data   fusion,  idiotypic 
network models are used for the purpose of robotic 
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control [12]. Although  belonging to the field of arti- 
ficial immune systems,  the DCA differs from other 
immune inspired anomaly detection algorithms in a 
number of significant ways: 
–    The  algorithm is based  on cutting  edge experi- 
mental  immunology. 
–    DCs combine multiple signals to assess the current 
context  of their environment. 
–    Asynchronolsly  DCs sample another data  stream 
(antigen) to be combined with the fused signals. 
–    The   correlation   between  context   and   antigen 
leads to the detection of anomalies. 
–    Unlike other anomaly detection  algorithms, there 
is no pattern matching  based on string  similarity 
metrics. 
The  aims  of this  paper  are  threefold:  to  model 
artifical  DCs drawing  inspiration from the  DCs of 
the  human  immune  system;  to present a resultant 
algorithm through a formalised  description;  and to 
apply  the algorithm to an example anomaly  detec- 
tion problem. As this algorithm is a novel algorithm, 
it  is not  yet  fully  characterised. As a  result,  fine 
grained analysis of the selection of weights and com- 
parison  to  other  standard techniques  are  not  dis- 
cussed in this  paper.  Please  refer to [8] for further 
experiments. 
In this paper The DCA is applied to the detection 
of a port scan, which forms a convenient small-scale 
computer security problem. Section 2 contains relev- 
ant background  information regarding  the problem 
of port  scans and  current scanning  detection  tech- 
niques. Section 3 presents  the biological inspiration 
of the DCA, a summary  of relevant developments  in 
immunology,  and  rudimentary DC biology. This  is 
followed by Sections 4 and 5, describing the abstrac- 
tion  process,  a formalised  description of the  DCA 
and its implementation as an anomaly detector. This 
is followed by experimentation with its application 
as a port scan detector. Section 6 includes a sensitiv- 
ity analysis of a selection of parameters. The paper 
concludes with a discussion of the results of the port 
scan investigation and suggestions for future  work. 
 
 
2.  Anomaly Detection and Port Scanning 
 
One notable  application area of multi-sensor  data 
fusion is anomaly  detection,  a technique used in In- 
trusion  Detection, which uses behaviour  based  ap- 
proaches  to detect  abuse  and  misuse  of computer 
systems. Traditional approaches  to computer  secur- 
ity  have  relied  on  signature based  approaches  for 
the detection  of intruders. Network based intrusion 
detection  systems (IDS) such as Snort[25] cross ref- 
erence patterns of network packets against  a data- 
base of known intrusions.  If a packet  matches  any 
of the signatures contained  in the database an alert 
is generated,  notifying the user of a potential intru- 
sion. One problem with signature based approaches 
is that slightly modified intrusions  or brand-new in- 
trusions  are not detected as they are not contained 
within the database resulting  in false negatives. 
Anomaly detection offers an alternative approach, 
by using  a defined  database of ‘normal’,  either  in 
terms of machine behaviour or user behaviour. Data 
at run time is compared  against  the normal  profile 
and  suffiecient deviation  causes  the  generation   of 
alert.  This is demonstrated through the research  of 
the negative selection algorithm[13]which  forms the 
majority  of anomaly  detection research within arti- 
ficial immune systems. Unfortunately, defining what 
is normal is non-trivial  and has a tendency to change 
over time,  giving rise to  systems  with  a high rate 
of false positives. To overcome the problems of false 
positives,  a whole host of methods  have  been em- 
ployed.  This  frequently  involves adding  a dynamic 
profiler to account for expected changes in the nor- 
mal profile, or the  use of more and  disparate data 
sources. It is worthy of note that 
In computer security, anomaly detection  has been 
applied  to a wide range of problems.  This  includes 
the  detection  of trojans,  viruses,  rootkits,  network 
expoits, and distributed denial of service. As an ap- 
plication  of anomaly  detection  in computer secur- 
ity, we examine the problem of detecting  port-scans. 
They are a key tool in initiating  an attack,  and are 
frequently  used in ‘insider attacks’  which  are  per- 
formed by authorised users. 
 
 
2.1.  General  Principles of Port  Scanning 
 
Port Scanning  is a technique  of network carto- 
graphy. It is used by system administrators to check 
specified hosts on their  network for availability and 
to monitor  services in use. However it can be sub- 
verted  for more malicious  purposes.  Port  scanning 
tools such as ‘Network Mapper’ (nmap) [23] can re- 
veal information about hosts responding  on a given 
set of network addresses.  This  information may be 
used by attackers  to discover  a set of target hosts 
which are operating  services likely to be vulnerable 
to attack.  It can also be used for an attacker to learn 
and understand the topology of a network in order 
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to launch  an attack  such as a distributed denial  of 
service. 
A host on an IP network  has one or more IP ad- 
dresses.  Each  IP  address  has  a range  of 216    TCP 
ports  and  216    UDP  ports.  Ports  are simply  a way 
of multiplexing  many different types of communica- 
tion through a single network address. This is why it 
is possible to download mail and surf the web at the 
same time.  A program  running  on a network  host 
may listen for requests on one or more (address,  pro- 
tocol, port) tuples. Many services typically listen for 
requests  on standard port  numbers  (such  as TCP 
port  80 for the  HTTP service),  though  in reality, 
a service can be located  on any port number.  Port 
scanning  involves probing  a host to discover poten- 
tial exploitable  ports. 
Instances   of port  scans  differ  from  each  other 
through   a  number  of important properties.  At a 
high level of abstraction there  are two distinctions 
to be made. Firstly,  modern networks are comprised 
of suites  of various  network protocols  which  offer 
different kinds of endpoints  which can be useful to 
map.  This work restricts discussion to IP networks 
in which there are IP address,  TCP  port and UDP 
port endpoints. Scans which map out these different 
types of endpoints  use different methods. Secondly, 
attackers rarely  wish  to  scan  every  possible  end- 
point reachable  from their  network, so a subset  of 
endpoints   are  selected  for  mapping.   The  way  in 
which the scope of the  scan is restricted leads to a 
differing ‘scan footprint’. 
Once  a scanner  has  created  a list  of endpoints, 
a probe is performed  on each endpoint in order  to 
obtain the scan results. As mentioned,  various probe 
techniques are available depending  on what  kind of 
endpoint is being probed and for what information. 
The three  main types of probe are: 
(i)  Host  probe:  Determining if a given network 
address is assigned to a host 
(ii)  Port probe: Determining  if a service is listen- 
ing at an (address,  protocol, port)  tuple 
(iii)  Service probe: Determining  what  kind of ser- 
vice  is  running   over  an  (address,   protocol, 
port)  tuple 
Host probes are typically carried  out by sending 
ICMP echo requests to the IP address being queried. 
For this reason host scans are usually referred to as 
“ping scans”  after  the  name of the  UNIX program 
for sending these packets. If a host is associated with 
the queried IP address it may respond with an ICMP 
echo reply.  However  many  systems  simply  do not 
respond  to  echo requests  due  to  the  potential  for 
abuse.  For this  reason TCP  probes may be sent to 
a port  likely to  be un-filtered  (such  as TCP  port 
80)  and  any  response  at  all  from  that address  is 
considered positive.  If there  are intervening  routers 
between the  scanner  and  the  target host an ICMP 
host unreachable message may be generated for any 
traffic sent to an inactive  address. 
In  the  TCP/IP protocol  suite,  UDP  and  TCP 
port probes are possible. TCP  port scans occur with 
much  higher  frequency  than other  types of scan. 
The simplest type of TCP  probe connects to a port 
on a remote  address  and if the connection  succeeds 
immediately  closes the connection.  A more stealthy 
approach, termed  a “SYN scan”  simply  sends  the 
first packet of the three-way handshake  and uses the 
response  packet  to  distinguish  between open and 
closed ports.  This usually requires super-user  priv- 
ileges. The only available technique for probing UDP 
ports is to send a packet containing  random  data  to 
a UDP port on a remote host. If the port is open no 
response will be generated and if the port  is closed 
an ICMP  port unreachable error  message is gener- 
ated.  Service scans  are  typically  carried  out after 
a port scan and  lead to knowledge of the  the  type 
and version of operating  system and network service 
software running  on a remote  host. In fact, the ex- 
act behaviour  elicited by a host as a response to any 
of these probe types can be used in determining  the 
operating  system type and version. 
These probing techniques  may be combined with 
lists of endpoints  to perform different types of scan. 
Three classes of scan footprint suffice to describe any 
particular scan type: 
(i)  Horizontal  Port  Scan: Here the attacking host 
scans a range of IP addresses  using the  same 
port.  This can reveal a set of ‘live’ hosts on a 
network with a specific open port. This is also 
used in several scanning worms based attacks. 
According  to  Staniford  et  al [27] this  is the 
most common type of scan footprint. 
(ii)  Vertical  Port  Scan: The  attacking host  sends 
several packets to the same IP address across a 
range of ports. This is used to target a specific 
host to examine any open ports  or to uncover 
vulnerable running  services. This can also be 
used  to  retrieve detailed  information on the 
OS of the victim host. 
(iii)  Block Scan: This is a hybrid method  combin- 
ing a range of addresses with a range of ports. 
This is also used to target specific hosts. It is 
also used to generate  ’hit-lists’ for future  at- 
tacks. Block scans can potentially take a very 
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long time, hence the results of a ping scan may 
be used to dramatically reduce the number of 
endpoints  to be probed. 
Port scans may seem innocuous,  but  they can be 
used for malicious purposes.  It is reasonable  to use 
a port-scan  as a model of an  intrusion given that 
they  frequenly play some role in an attack,  be it a 
targeted exploit  or a scanning  worm.  Staniford  et 
al are  quoted  as  saying  “...  we detect in  practice 
that almost all of them [unsolicited scans] come from 
compromised hosts and are very likely to be hostile”. 
Suprisingly,  port scan  detection  appears  to  be an 
under-researched area,  while port  scanning  occurs 
frequently  as a pre-cursor  for more serious attacks. 
The detection  of an ICMP ping scan forms the focus 
of the remainder of this section. 
 
 
2.2.  Port  Scan Detection 
 
Previous work in this area is suprisingly somewhat 
sparse.  A number  of IDS have the capability  to de- 
tect some types of port scan[28,27,24] but most have 
so far relied on the assumption that X events occur 
within  time frame Y . For example,  Spice by Stani- 
ford et al [27]produces an alert  every time  a single 
IP connected to more than 15 hosts within time win- 
dow Y . However, these types of technique  cannot be 
used to detect stealthy scans which do not produce 
enough events within the specified time window. 
The  detection  of scanning  worms is a closely re- 
lated and comparatively well researched area. Scan- 
ning worms frequently  use port scans to generate  a 
list of vulnerable  hosts for propagation. Schecter  et 
al [26]use a technique called reverse sequential hypo- 
thesis testing.  This  is based  on connection  analysis 
which determines the probability of a connection be- 
ing anomalous.  These data  are combined with net- 
work flow information and  the data  sources correl- 
ated.  Detection of scanning  using the  worm detec- 
tion  approach  resulted  in the  detection  of all but 
the stealthiest scans, namely those with a very slow 
scanning  rate. 
A worm detection  technique  pertinent to ICMP 
scan detection is the use of ICMP  destination 
unreachable   errors  (Type  3  error)   to detect  the 
propagation of worms  across  a network.  Bakos  et 
al [2] used the capture and analysis of ICMP  pack- 
ets  and  packet  flow to  identify  ‘blooms’ of ICMP 
traffic across  a network. They  assume  that a high 
rate  of Type 3 errors is indicitive  of a worm. Early 
detection  of scanning  worms  was  achieved  in  the 
preliminary results  presented. More details  regard- 
ing the  use of this  technique  in a realistic  network 
scenario under  more noisy test conditions  have not 
been reported so far. 
The  idea  of detecting the  response  to  a scan as 
opposed  to the  scan itself is similar  to the  danger 
detection  mechanisms  which inspires  the  DCA. As 
opposed to examining  incoming  data  to see if you 
are the recipient of a scan based attack, the outgoing 
data can be used to detect if your host is infected and 
is now scanning  the  local subnet. This  approach  is 
known as extrusion  detection  and has proven effect- 
ive in the prevention  of spam across a medium  size 
network  [4]. It has been shown that a high propor- 
tion of attacks, especially within a corporate setting, 
can originate  from within  the organisation itself as 
a result of misuse out of malice or ignorance.  The 
detection  of ‘insider-attacks’ is a pertinent problem, 
to which extrusion  detection  may prove useful. 
 
 
2.3.  Port  Scanning  Summary 
 
Port scanning is both a useful tool for network ad- 
ministration and maliciously for use in the discovery 
of vulnerable  hosts. Different types of scan are used 
for different purposes, with the most common type 
of scans based on the TCP protocol across a range of 
IP  addresses,  namely  horizontal  scans. ICMP  ping 
scans are also popular  as they are a very fast way of 
gaining network topology information, which can be 
used in future attacks.  Detection techniques for port 
scans frequently rely on the assumption of detecting 
a number  of events occuring within a time window. 
This is not effective in detecting  more sophisticated 
scans. Scanning  worm detection involves a number 
of the  same  principles.  Alternative approaches  in- 
clude backward scan detection where the response of 
scanned  hosts is used in place of detecting the port 
scan packets.  ‘Extrusion  detection’,  where outgoing 
packets are examined,  is useful for the detection of 
spam and could be used for the detection  of insider 
attacks. 
 
 
3.  The Immune System: A DC’s Perspective 
 
The human  immune system is a complex and ro- 
bust system,  viewed as a homeostastic protection 
agent[5].  It  seeks out harmful  pathogens, clearing 
them  from the  body  and  performing  maintenance 
and  repair.  Classically  the  immune  system  is sub- 
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divided  into  two  distinct  systems:  the  innate  and 
adaptive immune system. 
The  innate  immune system contains a variety of 
cells including macrophages  and DCs amongst oth- 
ers, [15]. The innate  immune system is the first line 
of defence against  attack  from invading  organisms. 
The  cells of the  innate  system  express proteins  on 
their  surface,  called  receptors,  and  have  the  abil- 
ity to detect and dispose of pathogens  via ingestion 
through  phagocytosis.  The selectivity of the recept- 
ors for pathogenic material  evolved within the devel- 
opment of our species and  is passed  down through 
the generations[7]. 
The   adaptive   immune   system   consists  of  two 
classes of cell, T-cells and B-cells. They  differ from 
innate  cells as  their  receptors  are  generated  over 
the  lifetime of the  individual, not  through the  de- 
velopment of the species. The  fine tuning  of these 
receptors,  performed  during  childhood,  plays a key 
role in adaptation to previously un-encountered 
threats. For  example,  T-cells  are  selected  in their 
early stage of development. Antigens,  made of pro- 
tein  and  derived  from  self cells, are  presented   to 
the  naive  T-cells.  Those  cells with  a high  affinity 
or  can  bind  strongly to  self antigen  are  deleted, 
leaving a set of detectors  with receptors  specifically 
designed  to  detect  antigens  which  do  not  belong 
to the  host.  This  forms the  core of the  self-nonself 
theory  proposed in 1959 (described  in [15]). 
Since the  1970s immunology  has developed  in a 
number of significant ways. It was proposed that T- 
cell binding  to pathogenic  antigens  is incapable  of 
initiating immune  activation without  the  presence 
of a second signal[15]. Investigation into vaccine de- 
velopment highlighted  the need to add stimulatory 
molecules derived from pathogens  (adjuvants) to in- 
noculations  in order for the process to be effective. 
Antigens  in the  innocculation have different struc- 
tures than  antigens belonging to self, yet an adverse 
response is not observed. 
In addition to adjuvants, the immune system does 
not react to ‘friendly’ bacteria  in the intestines, des- 
pite their prevalence. In the case of autoimmune dis- 
eases such as multiple sclerosis, the immune system 
reacts  destructively against  the body’s  own  cells. 
Why should a system which has been filtered against 
self reactivity, respond actively to ‘self ’ without any 
obvious  cause?  Self-nonself could  not  account for 
these  imporant effects, so researchers  turned their 
attentions to the cells of the innate  immune system 
for answers. 
In 1989, immunologist  Charles  Janeway  and  his 
collegues proposed the infectious nonself model[14]. 
This  is a  two signal  model  that states   that only 
antigens presented  with co-stimulatory molecules 
(CSMs)  can  activate T-cells.  T-cells  do not  reside 
in tissue, but are stored in lymph nodes, where they 
are given antigen by antigen  presenting  cells, which 
include  DCs.  Janeway  showed that when DCs are 
exposed  to  ‘signals’, forming  a  class  of molecules 
known  as pathogen associated  molecular  patterns 
(PAMPs),  matching  T-cells became activated[14]. 
PAMPs are exogenous signals which are molecules 
produced  exclusively by pathogens. The  receipt of 
PAMPs  is thought to enhance  the binding  between 
T-cell and DC. Foreign antigens  are not recognised 
unless they are accompanied by PAMP signals which 
confirm their  status as nonself. This explained why 
stimulatory adjuvants are necessary  for immunisa- 
tions to be successful. Unfortunately, the infectious 
nonself model can not explain the phenomena of 
autoimmunity. 
The  Danger  Theory  was proposed  by controver- 
sial immunologist Polly Matzinger  in 1994[18]. She 
stated  that the immune system is controlled by the 
detection of damage to the body, not the detection of 
antigen structures or bacterial products.  Matzinger 
proposes that signals do not  come from exogenous 
sources, but  are  endogenous  and  produced  by the 
cells of the tissue themselves. These endogenous sig- 
nals are termed  danger  signals. The  danger  theory 
also proposes  that the  cells of the  innate  immune 
system  can  actively  suppress  an  immune  response 
in the absence of danger in the tissue. This is medi- 
ated  through the recognition  of ‘tissue context’ de- 
rived based on the balance between two types of cell 
death:  necrosis and apoptosis[6]. 
Under healthy conditions, cells still die. Apoptosis 
or planned  cell death  regulates  growth and develop- 
ment.  During  apoptosis  the  cell’s internal  contents 
are gracefully degraded.  Genetic material  is cut into 
orderly  fragments  and  destructive enzymes known 
as lysosomes or ‘suicide-sacs’ digest the cell from the 
inside out.  This  prevents any loss of membrane  in- 
tegrity.  Eventually the  apoptosing  cell shrinks  and 
produces  output signals  e.g. tissue  necrosis  factor 
alpha. 
DCs are sensitive to an increase in the signals of 
apoptosis and are attracted to the dying cell. Even- 
tually  the cell is found by a DC and ingested.  Very 
little debris is left in the tissue and during this pro- 
cess. If the  cell is ingested  by an DC, the  protiens 
contained  within  the  cell are  presented to  the  im- 
mune  system  as antigen  in a ‘safe’ context,  as the 
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cell died of a normal process. The immune system is 
then  tolerised  to antigens  with the same structure. 
This dynamic process is known as the mechanism of 
peripheral  tolerance[20]. 
Not  all  cells  die  in  this   clean  and   controlled 
manner,  as in the  case of cell death  as a result of 
injury. Cell stress can occur through irradiation, 
shock, hypoxia  or pathogenic  infection,  leading  to 
the  death   of  the  cell  via  necrosis.  Unlike  apop- 
tosis  the  internal cell contents  degrade  chaotically 
and  the  cell membrane  loses its integrity.  Irregular 
fragments   of DNA  are  produced  and  oxidised  to 
become uric acid crystals,  with heat  shock proteins 
and  other  hydrophobic compounds  released  from 
the cell. These molecules were previously separated 
from the tissue fluid by the cell membrane and form 
the  danger  signals[20]. Dendritic  cells are sensitive 
to  changes  in  concentration  of the molecules  re- 
leased  as a result  of necrosis.  Upon  the detection 
of danger,  the  DC  migrates   from  the  tissue  and 
presents  any collected debris  as antigen to T-cells, 
causing activation. 
To summarise,  danger  theory  states that the im- 
mune  system is activated by DCs  upon  receipt  of 
danger signals. DCs have the ability to combine sig- 
nals from apoptosis, necrosis and PAMPs, and to use 
this  information to instruct the  immune  system  to 
respond appropriately. Unlike the assertions  of self- 
nonself, this model emphasises that signals from the 
environment dictate the  behaviour  of the immune 
system, not the structure of antigens. Dendritic  cells 
are the  natural data  fusion agents  which have the 
ability  to combine both  endogenous and exogenous 
signals  with  antigen  to  detect  invading  pathogens 
and to maintain tolerance[22]. 
 
 
3.1.  Introducing  Dendritic Cells 
 
To derive an algorithm based on the danger theory 
it is necessary  to understand the mechanisms  used 
by DCs to detect pathogens. DCs belong to a family 
of cells known as macrophages, whose function is to 
clear the tissue of debris. Unlike other macrophages, 
DCs have a specialised role as professional  antigen 
presenting  cells and  control  the  activation state  of 
T-cells  in  the  lymph  nodes.  The  term  “dendritic 
cell” refers to the fact that they can have long finger 
like projections  which resemble dendrites.  They are 
a class of cell, which exist  in three  distinct states: 
immature (iDC),  semi-mature(smDC) and  mature 
(mDC),  shown in Figure  1. The  state  of differenti- 
ation is determined by the relative signal concentra- 
tion they receive while in the tissue. 
 
Immature DC ‘Semi-mature’ DC Mature DC 
 
 
 
 
Fig.  1. Immature , ‘Semi-mature’ and  Mature Dendritic Cells 
ESMicrograph picture (see  acknowlegements) 
 
 
 
3.2.  Immature DCs (iDC) 
 
On arrival  in the tissue, DCs are found in an im- 
mature state[17]. Here, iDCs collect debris, some of 
which is used  as antigen.  Antigens are  complexed 
with  an  auxilliary   molecule  necessary   for  T-cell 
binding  and  are transported to the  cell membrane 
for presentation. In addition to antigen  processing, 
DCs  can  sense  the  various  signals  that may  be 
present  in  the  tissue  through receptors  expressed 
on  the  cell’s surface.  These  receptors   are  sensit- 
ive  to PAMPs,   danger  signals  and  ‘safe signals’. 
The relative  proportions and potency  of the differ- 
ent signals determines the  iDC’s terminal  state of 
differentiation.  Receipt  of  signals  causes  changes 
to  the  function,  morphology  and  behaviour  of the 
iDC.  The  result  of exposure  to  signals  causes  the 
production  of molecules called cytokines  which can 
either  activate  or suppress  the  immune  system.  It 
is important to note  that iDCs cannot  present an- 
tigen directly  to or activate T-cells directly  as they 
do not produce the necessary cytokines. 
 
 
3.3.  Mature  DCs (mDC) 
 
DCs which have the ability to both  present anti- 
gen and activate T-cells are termed mature DCs. For 
an iDC to become an mDC, the iDC must be exposed 
to  a  greater  quantity of either  PAMPs  or danger 
signals than  safe signals. Exposure  to signals takes 
place during the iDCs antigen collection stage. Suffi- 
cient exposure to PAMPs  and danger signals causes 
the DC to cease antigen collection and migrate from 
the  tissue  to the lymph  node. The  high concentra- 
tion of T-cells in the lymph nodes increases the prob- 
ability  of a successful  antigen  match  between  DC 
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and T-cell. During  the migration, the iDC changes 
morphologically  to  become  a mDC  by  developing 
whispy finger-like projections  which gives them an 
increased surface area. This further increases the 
probabiltiy  of binding with a T-cell[22]. An increase 
in surface  area  makes  the  mDC  more  suitable  for 
antigen presentation rather than  collection. 
Most importantly, mDCs produce an inflammat- 
ory cytokine called Interleukin-12, which stimulates 
T-cell  activation. Additionally the  mDC  produces 
costimulatory molecules (CSMs),  which are known 
to  facilitate   the  antigen  presenting  process  [21]. 
PAMPs  and  danger  signals  detected  in the  tissue 
while in the  immature phase  are thought to be re- 
sponsible  for the  production of Interleukin-12 and 
CSMs. 
 
 
 
 
 
Immature 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-collect antigen 
-receive signals 
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Safe Signals 
 
 
 
 
Danger Signals 
PAMPS 
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-present antigen 
-produce costimulation 
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-present antigen 
-produce costimulation 
-provide reactive cytokines 
-in  lymph  node 
 
3.4.  Semi-mature DCs (smDC) 
 
Under apoptotic conditions,  exposure to safe sig- 
nals diverts  the  iDC to a terminal  state known as 
‘semi-mature’. They appear morphologically very 
similar to mDCs and can present antigen,  yet they 
do not  have the  ability to activate  T-cells. Instead 
of secreting Interleukin-12, the smDC produces 
Interleukin-10. 
Interleukin-10 suppresses T-cells which match the 
presented antigen.  Antigens collected with safe sig- 
nals are presented  in a tolerogenic context  and lead 
to unresponsiveness to those antigens. Evidence sug- 
gests  that safe signals  have  a greater  influence on 
DCs than  PAMPs  and danger  signals, and can act- 
ively inhibit the production of Interleukin-12 while 
increasing  production of Interleukin-10[32].  This  is 
a natural mechanism  designed to stop the immune 
system over reacting  to antigens. In essence, the im- 
mune system expends considerable time and energy 
preventing  reactions  to harmless antigen or self an- 
tigen. 
 
 
3.5.  Summary 
 
Dendritic  cells are antigen  presenting  cells which 
have the power to control the adaptive immune re- 
ponse. DCs initial  function  is to collect debris from 
the tissue called antigen. Instructions to the adapt- 
ive immune system are derived based on the relative 
signal concentration found in the tissue  where im- 
mature DCs reside, represented in Figure  2. Three 
signal categories  have been discovered. Pathogenic- 
ally derived PAMPs  and danger  signals from dying 
 
Fig.   2.  An  abstract view  of DC  maturation and  signals  
re- quired for differentiation. CKs denote cytokines. 
 
cells cause the DC to  mature and  present  antigen 
to the effector T-cells. Conversely,  signals collected 
as a result  of apoptotic death  cause the DC to ma- 
ture  to a different ‘semi-mature’  state.  The smDCs 
cannot  activate T- cells, but  cause presentation of 
antigens  in a tolerogenic  context,  vital  to the  pre- 
vention of autoimmunity. The mechanism  by which 
DCs process signals is intricate, and  the  three  sig- 
nal concentrations are fused within the cell to influ- 
ence the  resulting  output of CSMs, Interleukin-10 
and Interleukin-12. This output informs the immune 
system how to respond  appropriately. 
 
 
4.  From in vivo to in silico 
 
Through close collaboration  with  immunologists 
[32], we have abstracted what  we believe to be the 
essential  features  of DC biology. DCs are examined 
from a cellular perspective, which includes the dif- 
ferentiation states,  interaction with signals and an- 
tigen. Representations of signals,  antigen  and  the 
different DC states form the core of this abstraction. 
The following properties  of DC function  are used, 
and summarised in Figure 2: 
–    Signals and Antigen: 
(i)  Exposure to signals initiates maturity of an iDC 
not the collection of antigen. 
(ii)  The quantity of output signals produced  is de- 
termined by processing input signals from the 
environment, and can be viewed as an interpret- 
ation of the relative input  signal strength. 
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(iii)  Input  signals to a DC are either PAMPs  derived 
from pathogenic signatures,  danger signals from 
damaged  tissue or safe signals from normal cell 
death. 
(iv)  Overall decision of tolerance or activation is dic- 
tated by the  combined  behaviour  of a popula- 
tion of DCs. 
–    Immature DCs: 
(i)  iDCs can differentiate  to become either  mDCs 
or smDCs. 
(ii)  The  path  of differentiation is dictated by  the 
complement of signals  to  which  an  iDC is ex- 
posed. 
(iii)  Each iDC can sample multiple  antigens,  which 
are internalised and re-presented with cytokines 
reflecting the context. 
–    Semi-Mature  DCs: 
(i)  Safe signals suppress the production of the ma- 
ture  output signal. 
(ii)  The  smDCs  produce  a different output signal 
which confirms that the  presented  antigen  was 
collected in a normal environment. 
–    Mature  DCs: 
testing   of ideas  and  algorithms, as  shown  in  the 
works of Twycross [29] and Greensmith et al [10]. 
Libtissue is a library  implemented in C which 
assists  the  implementation and  testing  of immune 
inspired  algorithms  on real-world  data.  It  is based 
on principles of innate immunology[30] [31], through 
the use of compartmentalisation, and uses tech- 
niques from modeling, simulation  and artificial-life. 
It allows researchers  to implement algorithms as a 
collection  of cells, antigen  and  signals  interacting 
within  a  specified compartment. The  implement- 
ation  has  a  client/server  architecture, with  com- 
munication perfromed  via sockets using the  SCTP 
protocol.  This  architecture  separates data   collec- 
tion using clients, from data  processing on a server, 
as shown in Figure 3. 
 
 
 
 
clients server 
 
compartment 
(i)  Both mDCs and smDCs can present antigen by 
producing  costimulatory molecules. 
(ii)  The mDCs produce an output signal which con- 
firms that the presented antigen  were collected 
in a context  of danger  and damage 
 
 
5.  The Dendritic Cell Algorithm 
antigen 
systrace 
response 
signal 
signal collector 
antigen store 
 
 
cells (AIS, DCs) 
 
 
signal store 
 
The DCA is an algorithm which uses a population 
of agent-like,  software-based   artificial  DCs  which 
combine data  from disparate sources. This descrip- 
tion of the DCA is based on an implemented version 
of the  algorithm  made  possible through the  use of 
the libtissue framework[31]. 
 
 
5.1.  Libtissue 
 
The  Danger   Project   [1]  has  produced  a  vari- 
ety   of  research   outcomes   alongside   the   DCA: 
the  development of danger  theory and  DC  based 
immunology[32];  a  framework  for  developing  im- 
mune inspired  algorithms called libtissue[31]; an 
investigation into  the  interactions between  the  in- 
nate  and  adaptive  immune  system;  artificial  tissue 
[3] and  the  application of a  naive  version  of the 
DCA for the  security  of sensor networks. Libtissue 
is the  API  used within  the  Danger  Project  for the 
 
Fig.   3.  Architecture used  to  support the DCA.  Input data 
are  processes  via  signal  and  antigen  clients.  The  algorithm 
utilises this data and resides  on a server. 
 
Input   data   are  processed  using  libtissue cli- 
ents,  which  transform raw  data  into  antigen  and 
signals. Algorithms  can be implemented within the 
libtissue server, as libtissue provides a conveni- 
ent programming environment. Antigen  and  signal 
sources can be added to libtissue servers, facilitat- 
ing the testing  of the same algorithm with a number 
of different data  sources. Input  data  from the client 
passed  to  and  represented in a compartment con- 
tained  on a server known as a tissue compartment. 
This  is a space in which cells, signals and  antigen 
interact. Each  tissue compartment has a fixed-size 
antigen store where antigen provided by libtissue 
clients is placed. The tissue compartment also stores 
levels of signals,  set either  by the  input clients  or 
cells. 
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5.2.  Abstract  View of the DCA Input Data 
 
The DCA is implemented as a libtissue tissue 
server.  Input  signals  are  combined  with  a  second 
source  of data,   such  as  a  data   item  ID,  or  pro- 
gram  ID  number.  This  is achieved  through using 
a  population of artificial  DCs  to  perform  aggreg- 
ate  sampling  and  data  processing.  Using multiple 
DCs  means  that multiple  data  items  in  the  form 
 
 
‘Tissue’ 
- Storage area for data 
 
S1 
 
S2 
Signal Matrix 
behavioural signals  S3 
 
 
 
 
Ag1 
 
Ag2 
 
Ag3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Antigen 
collected data 
of antigen  are  sampled  multiple  times.  If a  single 
DC presents  incorrect information,  it  becomes  in- 
consequential  provided  that the  majority  of DCs 
derive the correct  context.  The sampling  of data  is 
combined with context  information received during 
the antigen collection process. 
Different  combinations  of input  signals result  in 
(network 
flow) 
 
 
 
Data Sampling 
Phase 
... 
Sn 
... 
Agn 
(process IDs) 
two different antigen contexts.  Semi-mature antigen 
context implies antigen data was collected under 
normal  conditions,  whereas  a mature antigen  con- 
 
Maturation 
Phase 
Immature Dendritic Cell Population 
text signifies a potentially anomalous data item. The 
nature of the response is determined by measuring 
the number of DCs that are fully mature, represen- 
ted by a value, MCAV - the mature context antigen 
value. If the DCA functions  as intended,  the closer 
this value is to 1, the greater the probability that the 
antigen  is anomalous.  The MCAV is used to assess 
the degree of anomaly of a given antigen. By apply- 
ing thresholds at various levels, analysis can be per- 
 
 
 
‘Semi-Mature’ 
 
more safe 
signals 
 
more danger 
signals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Analysis 
 
 
 
‘Mature’ 
formed to assess the anomaly  detection  capabilities 
of the algorithm. 
The DCA has three stages: initialisation, update 
and aggregation.  Initialisation involves setting vari- 
ous parameters and is followed by the update  stage. 
The update stage can be decomposed into tissue up- 
date and cell cycle. Both  the tissue update  and cell 
cycle form the libtissue tissue server. Signal data 
are  fed from  the  data-source to  the  tissue  server 
through  the tissue client. A graphical representation 
of this process can be seen in Figure 4. 
The   tissue   update   is   a   continuous   process, 
whereby  the  values  of the  tissue  data   structures 
are refreshed. This occurs on an event-driven  basis, 
with  values  for signals  and  antigen  updated each 
time new data  appears  in the system. Antigen data 
enters tissue update in the same, event driven man- 
ner. The  updated signals provide the  input  signals 
for the population of DCs. 
The cell cycle is a discrete  process occurring at a 
user defined rate. In this paper, one cell cycle is per- 
formed per second. Signal and antigen from the tis- 
sue data  structures are accessed by the DCs during 
Fig.  4. Illustration of the DCA  showing  data input, continu- 
ous sampling, the maturation process  and aggregate analysis. 
 
the cell cycle. This includes an update  of every DC 
in the  system  with  new signal values and  antigen. 
The cell cycle and update  of tissue continues until a 
stopping  criteria is reached, usually until all antigen 
are processed. Finally,  the aggregation stage  is ini- 
tiated,  where all collected antigen  are subsequently 
analysed  and the MCAV per antigen derived. 
 
 
5.3.  Parameters and Structures 
 
The  algorithm is described  using  the  following 
terms. 
–    Indices: 
i = 0, ..., I input signal index; 
j = 0, ..., J input signal category  index; 
k = 0, ..., K tissue antigen index; 
l = 0, ..., L DC cycle index; 
m = 0, ..., M DC index; 
n = 0, ..., N DC antigen index; 
p = 0, ..., P  DC output signal index. 
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—    Parameters: 
I = number of input  signals per category; 
J = number  of categories  of input signal; 
K = number  of antigen in tissue antigen vector; 
L = number of DC cycles; 
M = number of DCs in population; 
N = DC antigen vector size ; 
P  = number  of output signals per DC; 
Q = number of antigens actually  sampled per DC 
for one cycle; 
R = maximum  number  of antigen  collected  per 
DC for one cycle (DC antigen receptors) ; 
Tmax  = tissue antigen vector size. 
suggested  values  for  weightings  given  in  Table  1 
and  presented in Figure  6. Both  the  equation  and 
weights are derived from observing experiments 
[32]performed  on  natural DCs  for the  purpose  of 
their  relative derivation. In the DCA each compon- 
ent of the antigen vector  provides  the  capacity  for 
storage  of individual   antigen.  Although   each  DC 
samples the same input antigen vector, each DC 
samples a different component,  potentially contain- 
ing an  antigen.Each DC  samples  the  same  input 
signal  matrix   and  each  ‘component  of the  signal 
matrix. 
P P 
 
i    j=3 
Wijp sij (m) 
—    Data  Structures: op (m) =     P P   
DCm ={s(m), a(m), o¯p (m), t(m)}-  a  DC  within 
the population; 
T = {S, A} - the tissue; 
 
 
Table 1 
 
i    j=3 
S = tissue signal matrix; 
sij   = a  signal  type  i,  category  j in  the  signal 
matrix  S; 
A = tissue antigen vector; 
ak   = antigen k in the tissue antigen vector; 
s(m)  = signal matrix  of DC (m); 
a(m)  = antigen vector of of DC (m); 
op (m) = output signal p of o DC (m); 
o¯p (m) = cumulative output signal p of DCm ; 
t( m) = migration  threshold of DCm ; 
wijp  = transforming weight from sij  op . 
Weights used  for signal  processing 
 
wijp j = 0 j = 1 j = 2 
p = 1 2 1 2 
p = 2 0 0 3 
p = 3 2 1 -3 
 
The  tissue has containers for signal and  antigen 
values, namely S and A. In the current implement- 
ation  of the DCA, there  are three  categories  of sig- 
nal (j = 2) and  1 signal per category  (i = 0). The 
categories  are derived  from the three  signal model 
of DC behaviour  described in Section 2 where: s0,0 
= PAMP  signals, s0,1 = danger  signals, and s0,2  = 
 
j=0 Sj=1 Sj=2 S j=3 Signal matrix  Tissue safe signals. An antigen store is constructed for use 
 
a 0      a 1     
a 2 
 
Antigen vector 
K 
update 
 
Cell 
within the tissue cycle where all DCs in the popula- 
tion collect antigen,  which is also introduced to the 
tissue in an event driven manner. 
DC 0 DC 1 DC 2 ... ... ...  DCm DC population cycle The  cell cycle maintains all DC data  structures. 
This  includes  the  maintenance of a population of 
 
S1 S2 S3 S 4 
 
a 0 a 1a 2 aN 
 
o0               o1             o2 
M 
DC  input  signal matrix 
 
DC  antigen store 
 
Output signals 
 
Migration threshold value 
 
 
DC m 
DCs, which form a sampling set of size M . Each DC 
has an input  signal matrix,  antigen  vector,  output 
signals, and  migration  threshold. The  internal val- 
ues of DCm  are updated, based on current data  in 
the tissue signal matrix  and antigen vector. The DC 
input signals, s(m) use the identical mapping for sig- 
nal categories as tissue s and are updated  every cell 
cycle iteration. Each s(m)  for DCm  is updated  via 
Fig.   5.  Tissue and  Cell  Update components,  where  Si,j   
is reduced to  Sj . 
 
The  data  structures  are  represented graphically 
in  Figure  5. Each  DCm    transforms each  value  of 
s(m)  to  op (m)  using  the  following equation  with 
an overwrite  every cell cycle. These values are used 
to calculate  output signal values, op(m) , for DCm , 
which are added cumulatively  over a number of cell 
cycles to form o¯p (m),  where p = 0 is costimulatory 
value,  p = 1 is the  mature DC  output signal,  and 
p = 2 is the  semi-mature DC  output signal.  With 
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5.5.  Antigen Aggregation 
 
PAMP CSM Once DCm   has  been removed  from the popula- 
Inputs tion,  the  contents  of a(m)   and  values o¯p (m)  are logged to a file for the aggregation  stage. Once com- 
pleted,  s(m),   a(m)   and o¯p (m)  are  all  reset,  and 
Danger 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Positive Weight 
 
 
 
 
 
Safe 
IL-10 
 
Outputs 
 
IL-12 
DCm  is returned to the  sampling  population. The 
re-cycling of DCs continues until the stopping condi- 
tion is met (l = L). Once all data has been processed 
by the DCs, the output log of antigen-plus-context 
is analysed.  The same antigen is presented  multiple 
time with different context  values. This information 
is recorded  in a log file. The  total  fraction  of ma- 
Negative Weight Thickness of line ~ Transforming Weight ture  DCs presenting  said antigen  (where  o¯1    > o¯2 ) 
is divided by the total  amount of times the antigen 
Fig.  6. A representation of the  three calculations performed 
by  each  DC  per  update cycle,  to  derive  the  cells  outputs 
through fusing  together the signal inputs. 
 
 
 
each cell update,  DCs sample R antigens  from the 
tissue antigen vector A. 
 
 
 
 
5.4.  The DCA 
 
The following pseudocode shows the initialisation 
stage, cycle stage, tissue update  and cell cycle. 
initialise parameters 
{I , J, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q} 
while (l < L) 
update A and S 
for m = 0 to M 
for 0 to Q 
DCm  samples Q antigen from A 
for all i = 0 to I and all j = 0 to J 
ij = sij 
for n = 0 to N 
DCm  processes aDC 
for p to P 
compute op 
o¯p (m) = o¯p (m) + op 
if o0 (m) > tm 
DCm  removed from population 
DCm  migrate, print antigen and 
context 
DCm  reset antigen vector and all 
signals 
l++ 
analyse antigen and calculate MCAV 
was presented namely o¯1 /(o¯1 + o¯2 ) . This is used to 
calculate  the mean mature  context antigen  value or 
MCAV. 
 
 
5.6.  Signals and Antigen 
 
An integral  part of DC function  is the  ability  to 
combine multiple  signals to influence the behaviour 
of the cells. The different input  signals have differ- 
ent effects on cell behaviour  as described in Section 
3. The semantics  of the different category  of signal 
are  derived  from the  study  of the  influence of the 
different signals on DCs in vitro. Definitions of the 
characteristics of each signal category  are given be- 
low, with  an  example  of an  actual signal  per  cat- 
egory. This categorisation forms the signal selection 
schema. 
—    PAMP - si0 e.g. the number of error messages gen- 
erated per second by a failed network connection 
(i)  a signature of abnormal behaviour  e.g. an error 
message 
(ii)  a high degree of confidence of abnormality asso- 
ciated with an increase in this signal strength 
—    Danger signal - si1 e.g. the number of transmitted 
network packets per second 
(i)  measure  of an attribute which significantly  in- 
creases in response to abnormal  behaviour 
(ii)  a moderate degree of confidence of abnormality 
with  increased  level of this  signal, though at  a 
low signal strength can represent normal beha- 
viour. 
—    Safe signal - si2 E.g. the inverse rate  of change of 
number of network packets per second. A high rate 
of change  equals a low safe signal level and  vice 
versa. 
(i)  a confident indicator of normal  behaviour  in a 
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predictable manner  or a measure  of steady-  be- 
haviour 
(ii)  measure  of  an  attribute  which  increases  sig- 
nal concentration due to the  lack of change  in 
strength 
Signals,  though  interesting, are  inconsequential 
without   antigen.  To  a  DC,  antigen  is an  element 
which is carried  and presented  to a T-cell, without 
regard  for the  structure of the  antigen.  Antigen  is 
the data  to be classified, and works well in the form 
of an identifier, be it an anomalous process ID[10] or 
the ID of a data item [9]. At this stage, minimal anti- 
gen processing is performed and the antigen presen- 
ted is an identical copy of the antigen collected. De- 
tection  is performed  through the correlation  of an- 
tigen  with  fused signals.  By processing of antigen, 
this  refers to the  process  by which antigen  is col- 
lected and presented for analysis by the DCs - it is 
noteworthy that no changes are made to the actual 
value of the antigen,  it is sampled  whole. 
The DCA could be interpreted as a neural network 
if its goal was to purely  classify based  on weighed 
sums alone. However the algorithm  is not designed 
for the purpose of classification, but sorts input data, 
in the form of antigen, through the use of data-fused 
signals. The signals are aggregated through time and 
across a population of cells, which is different to the 
processing performed by a series of neural networks. 
 
 
6.  PSI: Ping Scan Investigation 
 
The purpose of this investigation is as follows: 
(i)  To   apply   the   DCA   to   anomaly   detection 
through  bio-inspired  data  fusion. 
(ii)  To show how the system responds to the modi- 
fication of signal mappings. 
(iii)  To  understand the  sensitivity  of the system 
parameters and the sensitivity of the weights 
of the signal processing function. 
In this  paper,  port  scanning  is used  as a model 
intrusion, and  is described  in Section 2. The  DCA 
is applied to the detection  of an outgoing port  scan 
across a range of IP addresses,  based on the ICMP 
‘ping’ protocol.  It is assumed  that it is possible for 
the  attacker to gain access to the  machine  using a 
password cracking utility. 
The  type of scan used in this  investigation is an 
nmap ICMP  ‘ping’ scan. This type of scan is partic- 
ularly suitable  for the purpose of these experiments 
as it is suitable  for use on a network as it uses min- 
imal network resources and is a short duration scan 
(10-30 seconds  in duration). Ping  scans  involve a 
victim  machine,  connected  to a medium  sized sub- 
net of 100-200 machines, which has been subverted 
by our  hypothetical intruder.  The  premise  is that 
the intruder has logged into the victim machine re- 
motely  via ssh and  aims to retreive  a list  of hosts 
running  within  a similar  IP  address  range.  During 
the scan, the victim machine sends ICMP probes to 
other  hosts, specified at  run  time.  The  nmap  scan 
program  reports  back on the status of the scanned 
addresses as either appearing to be down or up. This 
allows an  attacker to  generate  a list  of hosts  cur- 
rently running  within a range of IP addresses.  This 
scan does not  require  root  privileges and  is one of 
the fastest  scans available.  Ping  scans also retrieve 
DNS information, resolving the IP address  of avail- 
able hosts. 
 
 
6.1.  Data  Sessions 
 
Two types of data  session are used in this invest- 
igation.  An  attack session consists  of a ping  scan 
embedded within a 70 second ssh session. Four pro- 
cesses (running  programs) of interest are identified 
in these sessions for the purpose of analysis includ- 
ing: ssh demon; bash shell; nmap scan program; and 
the pts sshd process which is the parent of the nmap 
scan. The ssh demon and the bash shell are normal 
process which occur in the attack  session. The scan 
uses a range  of 1020 IP  addresses  across a class C 
network.  The normal  session also involves a remote 
log in via ssh, and  also contains  the  transfer  of a 
file from the victim machine to a remote server, via 
scp. Again, four processes of interest are identified: 
bash shell; sshd; x-forwarding  agent; secure copy of 
a 2.5MB file. Ten  datasets are  generated for both 
the attack  and normal  protocols. 
 
 
6.2.  Signals 
 
Three  signal  categories  are  used,  with  one  sig- 
nal per category throughout this investigation. The 
signals  used  are  defined  in  Section  3, where  they 
are placed  in context with  their  biological inspira- 
tion.  Signals are collected from kernel statistics us- 
ing bash  scripting,  and  are  processed,  normalised 
and combined with antigen to form a log file. All sig- 
nals are normalised  real-values  within  a range of 0- 
100 for the PAMP and danger signal and 0-10 for the 
safe signal. It is important to note that preliminary 
examinations of the input signal data  indicate  that 
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analysis  of the signals individually  is insufficient to 
indicate  anomalies [11], which is further  highlighted 
in the DCLite  experiment. 
The  PAMP  signal  is generated from the  rate  of 
ICMP  destination unreachable errors  recieved  per 
second.  When  a ping  scan  is used,  ICMP  packets 
are  sent  to  the  machines  specified. Frequently the 
range of machines is specified as a block, for example 
X X.X X.20.1-254  would scan  all addresses  on the 
‘.20’ subnet 1 . It  is likely that numerous  machines 
within  that range  will not  accept ping probes and 
hence a DU error is sent back to the  scanning  ma- 
chine, as a signature of suspicious activity. 
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The danger  signal is derived from the number  of 
sent network packets per second. An increase in net- 
work traffic sent from the machine can be an indic- 
ator  of anomalous  behaviour.  However, under  cer- 
tian circumstances, such as uploading files via a tor- 
rent client or over peer-to-peer  networks, this is not 
as useful. 
To complement this  signal, the  safe signal is de- 
rived  using  the  first order  derivative  of packets/s, 
namely the rate of change of packets/s. This is based 
on the assumption that anomalous  traffic produces 
‘bursty’  rates  of sending,  whereas  uploading  large 
files will not  have  such  a variable  rate  of change. 
To derive the safe signal, a maximum  value for rate 
of change is defined. The  more variable  the  rate  of 
change, the greater  the decrement of the maximum 
value. This  is the  inverse rate  of change of packets 
per second. This counters an increased danger signal 
value under  ‘normal’ conditions,  and  may assist  in 
reducing false positives. A sketch of the input signals 
for both  sessions is represented in Figure  7, where 
0-50 seconds shows signals during  a ping scan and 
51-75 seconds shows the normal file transfer. 
 
 
6.3.  Antigen 
 
In these experiments the signals are used to detect 
the anomalous  nmap process and its sshd parent in 
the attack  scenario, and actively prevent a response 
to the scp file transfer. This cannot  be acheived by 
signals alone, as antigen is required  to correlate  the 
signals to the active  culprit processes. During  each 
session, all processes spawned by the controlling ssh 
sessions are monitored using the strace tool. Each 
of the processes is assigned a number identifier (PID) 
 
 
1     Full  IP addresses not given,  adhering with  our  
organisa- tion’s  security policy 
 
Fig.   7.    A  sketch  of the input signals  for  both  attack and  
normal sessions,  where  the  left  hand side  of the  figure  
rep- resents the  attack dataset, and  the  right normal. 
 
 
 
by the  operating  system.  To run,  each process  in- 
vokes the  use of system calls. The  more active  the 
process, the more system calls it makes. As antigen, 
each system  call is captured and converted  into an 
antigen,  with  a value of the  PID  to which the  sys- 
tem call belongs. In a similar manner  to the signals, 
output of this process is logged and combined with 
the signal data  to form the datasets for these exper- 
iments.  The multiplicity  of input antigen facilitates 
the function  of the algorithm, encompassing  a DCs 
ability to collect and process multiple  antigen  frag- 
ments  of identical  structure. 
 
 
 
 
6.4.  Experiments 
 
As shown in Section 5, the algorithm implemen- 
ted  with  libtissue  has  numerous  parameters. It  is 
necessary to understand the effect on the system by 
changing  these  parameters in order  to understand 
the  behaviour  of the  DCA.  The  experiments  per- 
formed assist in clarifying these effect, and fall into 
three  convenient categories: 
Series-1: Investigate  signal mappings:  does incor- 
rect data  mapping  influence the detection  rates? 
Series-2: Sensitivity of libtissue related parameters: 
which parameters can influence the system and at 
what  value? 
Series-3:  Sensitivity  of the weights  of the  signal 
processing  equation:  how to these  weights relate 
to each other  and what  effect on detection  arises 
from variation in the values? 
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6.5.  Series-1 
 
The aim of this series is to change the input signal 
mappings  to assess the  validity  of this  implement- 
ation.  The mapping  of the input signal category  to 
the raw data attributes is controlled primarily by the 
weights  of the  signal processing  equation.  By per- 
forming  experiments  such as switching  the  PAMP 
and safe signal we predict that the system would re- 
spond with a very high rate  of false positives.  This 
information is used  to  validate  the  use of this  al- 
gorithm on this particular problem. Three input sig- 
nals are used in series-1 inclusive of one PAMP  sig- 
nal (s0,0 ), one danger signal (s0,1 ,) and one safe sig- 
nal (s0,2 ). In order  to understand the principles  of 
mapping  signals to categories each chosen input  for 
the signals is used per category. 
The  permutations of this  experiment  are  shown 
in Table  2. We hypothesise  that the  DCA will not 
lose detection  accuracy when the incorrect mapping 
involves the PAMP  and danger  signal, as these sig- 
nals affect the DCs in a similar manner.  Conversely 
a mapping reversal between the danger and safe sig- 
nal  may result  in a poor  performance  as they  are 
treated differently in the signal processing function. 
All experiments  in this series are tested using all 20 
attack  and  normal  datasets, with  three  repeats  of 
each run per dataset. Similar experiments involving 
combinations  of 2, 3 and 4 input signals are presen- 
ted  in [11], to  which  the  interested  reader  should 
refer. 
Table 2 
Experiment codes  and  signal  mappings 
 
Experiement Code S0,0 S0,1 S0,2
M1 
 
M2 
 
M3 
 
M4 
 
M5 
 
M6 
P 
D 
S 
P 
S 
D 
D 
P 
D 
S 
P 
S 
S 
S 
P 
D 
D 
P
 
 
6.6.  Series-2 
 
Numerous parameters within libtissue are used 
to define the behaviour  of the artificial DC and the 
properties of the compartments. As a result several 
values which may influence the system need to be in- 
vestigated to assist in understanding the algorithm. 
A summary  of the series-2 experiment is presented 
in Table 3. The ten attack datasets are used for this 
series, providing  examples  of both  normal  and  an- 
omalous  data,  with  three  repeats  of each  run  per 
dataset. Four  key libtissue parameters are investig- 
ated: 
(i)  Number of DCs created  (C) 
(ii)  DC antigen vector size (N) 
(iii)  Number of DC antigen receptors  (R) 
(iv)  Size of tissue antigen vector (Tmax) 
 
Table 3 
Experiement codes  and  default parameter 
settings 
Experiment Code Parameter Values 
 
C  10; 100; 200; 500 
 
N 1; 2; 5; 10; 25; 50; 100 
 
R  1; 2; 5; 10; 20 
 
Tmax 50; 500; 1000; 5000; 10000 
 
 
 
6.7.  Series-3 
 
Essentially, each DC in the  sampling  population 
performs  data  fusion  through combining  multiple 
signals from disparate sources to produce output sig- 
nals, which are then correlated with data in the form 
of antigen. The combination of the input  signals is 
achieved using the signal processing equation de- 
scribed in Section 5, where processing is performed 
three times on the the input signals to produce three 
different output signals. Initially the weights chosen 
for this  purpose  were derived  from  empirical  bio- 
logical data.  Indeed,  the inter-relationship between 
the weights (as shown in Table  4) remains  inspired 
by these  data,  with  all weights  deriving  from  the 
weight of the PAMP signals. Two weights are invest- 
igated,  W1 and W2. 
Preliminary   tests   and   prior   experience   with 
the  DCA  indicate  values for W 1 and  W 2 should 
lie within  a  range  of 0 and  20 if the  maturation 
threshold is 60 (+/- 50%). An exhaustive  search of 
the following values is performed: 0.5; 1; 2; 4; 8; and 
16. This  results  in a total  of 36 experiments. One 
attack  dataset is selected  at  random  for use with 
three  runs performed  per parameter combination. 
 
 
6.8.  Parameters and Settings 
 
All experiments  are performed  on an AMD Ath- 
lon 1GHz Debian linux machine (kernel 2.4.10). The 
algorithm  is  implemented  within   the  libtissue 
 
14 
Name Symbol Value
Number of signals  per category 
Number of signals categories 
Max  number of tissue antigen 
Number of cells 
Max  number of antigen per DC 
Number  of output signals per  DC 
Number of DC  antigen receptors 
I 
J 
K 
M 
N 
P 
Q 
1 
 
3 
 
500 
 
100 
 
50 
 
3 
 
1 
 
Table 4 
Derivation and  interrelationship between weights in the  sig- 
nal  processing equation 
Output Signal Input  Signal Weight
o0 s0,0 
 
s0,1 
 
s0,2 
W 1 
 
W 1/2 
 
W 1 * 1.5
o1 s0,0 
 
s0,1 
 
s0,2 
0 
 
0 
 
1 
o2 s0,0 
 
s0,1 
 
s0,2 
W 2 
 
W 2/2 
 
W 2 * -1.5
 
Table 5 
Default parameter settings 
or ‘anomalous’ and  therefore  the  relevant rates  of 
true  and  false positives  can be shown. This  calcu- 
lation  is used throughout this  section.  The  results 
of each series of experiments are presented  with the 
relevant statistics shown. 
 
 
6.9.1.  Series-1 
The graph presented  in Figure 8 represents  a 
summary  of results for the attack datasets used with 
the original and correct mapping (M1). MCAVs 
generated by the two anomalous  processes are 0.82 
(with  a standard deviation,  stdev,  of 0.11) for the 
nmap process and 0.67 (stdev.= 0.22) for the parent 
pts  process. All statistical tests  are  performed  us- 
ing a paired  t-test, where p = 0.05, used whenever 
‘statistical significance’ is stated. These  values are 
statistically significantly  higher  than the  MCAVs 
produced   for   the   normal   processes.   The   bash 
MCAV is 0.02 (stdev=0.04) and the sshd MCAV is 
0.18 (stdev=0.24). The  variance  (stdev divided  by 
MCAV)  values  are  also larger  for the  two normal 
processes in contrast the the anomalous  items. 
 
1 
 
0.9 
 
 
 
 
framework, implemented in C (gcc 4.0.2) with  in- 
terprocess  communication facilitated  by the SCTP 
protocol.  All signals  are  derived  using  signal  col- 
lection scripts, with values taken from the ‘proc’ 
filesystem. Unless stated otherwise, default para- 
meters for all experiments  are presented in Table 5. 
 
 
6.9.  Results 
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In this  section  results  for all experimental series 
are presented, showing that the DCA can be used as 
a ping based port scan detection system. In all exper- 
iments  the MCAV coefficient is employed to assess 
the behaviour  and function of the DCA. The MCAV 
is the  mature  context  antigen  value and  is a num- 
ber between zero and one. The closer this value is to 
one, the  higher  the  probability that the monitored 
process is anomalous  as more antigen are presented 
in by the  algorithm in the  mature context  i.e. the 
anomalous  context.  Each  type  of antigen  is given 
a MCAV coefficient value  which can be compared 
against a threshold. Once a threshold is applied,  it 
is then possible to classify antigen as either ‘normal’ 
Fig.  8. MCAV  values  for  all  processes  and  all  mappings for 
the  attack datasets. Ten  attack datasets are used,  each  point 
representing a  mean of  30  values, as  number of  runs   per 
dataset =3. 
 
Figure  8 shows the MCAVs  generated per  pro- 
cess for each mapping, across the 10 attack datasets. 
The intended  mapping  (M1) is used as a baseline to 
which all other mappings are compared.  The results 
for M1 and M2 are similar, with high MCAVs for the 
anomalous  processes and low values for the normal 
items. Statistically, significant differences are shown 
between the MCAVs the bash process, as the bash 
MCAV in M1 is 0.02 as opposed to 0.27 for M2. This 
implies that incorrect mapping  between PAMP  and 
danger signals would not impair detection, save for a 
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slight increase in the rate of false positives. M3 pro- 
duced  significantly  higher  MCAV for the  two nor- 
mal processes than  M1, yet only minor  differences 
in the detection  of the anomalous  processes. Incor- 
rect mapping  of safe signals as PAMPs  leads to an 
increased rate  of false positives. 
In M4 the  MCAVs  for the  anomalous  processes 
are significantly smaller (p > 0.05) and significantly 
larger  for the normal  processes when compared  to 
 
in M4 is 0.64, which is significantly  lower than  the 
0.82 reached  using  M1.  This  trend is also  shown 
in M6, with  a nmap  MCAV of 0.61 (stdev=0.37). 
M5 exhibited  a  similar  increase  in  the  MCAV  of 
the normal processes, yet interestingly produced the 
highest MCAV  for the  anomalous  processes,  with 
the  lowest  standard deviation  for the  detection  of 
the  nmap  process. However, normal  MCAV values 
are significantly higher than observed in M1. All 
MCAVs  for this  experiment  are  shown  with  their 
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Bash 
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Xforward 
standard deviations  in Table  6. 
 
Table 6 
MCAV  values  for each  experiment across each dataset. 
 
Expt. Attack 
 nmap pts bash sshd
 mean stdev mean stdev mean stdev mean stdev
M1 
 
M2 
 
M3 
 
M4 
 
M5 
 
M6 
0.82 
 
0.86 
 
0.90 
 
0.64 
 
0.96 
 
0.61 
0.04 
 
0.27 
 
0.04 
 
0.29 
 
0.03 
 
0.37 
0.67 
 
0.78 
 
0.62 
 
0.29 
 
0.90 
 
0.08 
0.11 
 
0.12 
 
0.13 
 
0.29 
 
0.10 
 
0.06 
0.18 
 
0.28 
 
0.99 
 
0.20 
 
0.63 
 
0.40 
0.22
 
0.27
 
0.33
 
0.28
 
0.32
 
0.21
0.02
 
0.19
 
0.96
 
0.54
 
1.00
 
0.97
0.24
 
0.35
 
0.02
 
0.05
 
0.00
 
0.05
 
 
For the normal  datasets, similar trends are evid- 
ent, as shown in Figure 9. M1 shows very low MCAVs 
for all processes, indicating  a low rate  of false pos- 
itives.  M2 is similar,  also producing  low values for 
all processes of interest. The  scp process produced 
a higher  MCAV of 0.22 in M2, though  this is not 
statistically significant. M3 produced  the maximum 
MCAV  of 1 for all processes,  while M4 produced 
values over 0.5. Experiment M5 produced  interest- 
ing results. Despite poor performance  for the attack 
dataset, high  values of MCAV  are  not  present  in 
the  normal  dataset. The  MCAV for the  M5 scp is 
0.13, which is not  significantly  different to the res- 
ults  found  for M1. M6 produces  similar  results  to 
M3, but  the  MCAVs  are  not  as high (statistically 
significant,  p > 0.05). 
Fig.  9. Response varied signal  mappings for the normal ses- 
sions.  Each  processes  of interest is represented  individually. 
Values  represent mean  MCAV coefficients  from ten datasets, 
where  number of runs  = 3. 
 
6.9.2.  Series-2 
In  this  series,  various  DCA  parameters are  as- 
sessed. Cell numbers parameter results are presented 
in Figure  10. This  shows MCAVs per process, and 
each experiment is represented within each process. 
A high value of MCAV is shown for the nmap process 
for all values of cell number  above 100. Where  the 
number of cells is equal to 10, the MCAV is greatly 
reduced,  from 0.9 to  0.1. The  standard deviations 
of these values increases from 0.3 in C10, to 0.1 for 
all other  cell numbers.  Similarly  no significant dif- 
ference was found  between  C100,  C200 and  C500 
for any of the  processes. C10 also produced  higher 
MCAVs for the normal processes than for any other 
cell number. 
The DC antigen vector size parameter results are 
summarised in Figure 11. No significant differences 
are found when this parameter is varied,  for any of 
the  processes of interest. Marginally  impaired  per- 
formance  is shown when this size is set to 100, but 
this  was shown to  not  be significant.  One  explan- 
ation  for this  parameter’s insensitivity  is that the 
number of antigen is less influential than  the signals 
they are collected. Further analysis is performed us- 
ing the number of antigens processed to understand 
exactly the reasons for this effect. 
Hence, investigations in to the number of antigen 
sampled by one DC per iteration (number of antigen 
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Fig.  10. Cell number MCAV  per process  for the attack data- 
sets 
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Fig.  12.  Number of antigen receptors MCAV  per process  for 
the  attack datasets 
 
that the  DCA  is robust to  changes  in controlling 
parameters, provided that their  values lie within  a 
sensible range. 
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Fig.  11.   DC  antigen vector size  MCAV  per  process  for the 
attack datasets 
 
receptors) is performed,  and the results  are presen- 
ted in Figure 12. This shows no significant difference 
in the  MCAV  values  for the  detection  of the  two 
anomalous  processes.  Data  regarding  the  MCAVs 
of the  normal  processes suggests that an increased 
number of antigen receptors  can lead to higher than 
desired MCAVs. This is supported by the actual val- 
ues, where MCAV for the bash process is 0.38 in R20 
as opposed to 0.22 in R2. This difference is statist- 
ically significant,  demonstrated through the  use of 
a paired t-test (p >0.05). 
The  results  for the tissue  vector size, shown  in 
Figure 13, are similar to the receptor  results, in that 
no significant differences were shown for the nmap, 
pts and sshd processes. Again, differences were most 
pronounced  for the  bash  process with  a MCAV of 
0.28 for T50  and  0.08 for T500.  The  results  show 
 
 
Fig.  13. MCAV  per  process 
 
 
6.9.3.  Series-3 
Figures  14 to 17 show the  MCAVs generated by 
the  weights sensitivity  analysis.  The  resultant sur- 
face maps  are  produced  by  plotting  the  two con- 
trolling  weights,  W1 and  W2 on the  x- and  y-axes 
respectively,  and the MCAV per process present on 
the z-axis. The two anomalous  processes are shown 
in Figure  14 and  15. The  surfaces created  in these 
figures show that MCAV values for these processes 
lie consistently above 0.8. This indicates that the de- 
tection  of anomalous  processes is insensitive  to the 
values of the weights. 
Figures  16 and  17 show the  results  for the  sshd 
and  bash  processes.  Figure  16 exhibits  most  vari- 
ation within these four graphs. Peaks of high MCAV 
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Fig.   14.  3D  surface plot   of  varying weights  W1  and   W2. 
Nmap  process  represented. 
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Fig.   16.  3D  surface plot   of  varying weights  W1  and   W2. 
Bash  process  represented. 
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Fig.  15. 3D surface plot  of varying weights  W1 and  W2.  Pts 
process  represented. 
 
in excess of 0.8 are shown when W1 = 1 and W2 < 
8. A similar peak is evident in Figure 17. This graph 
also shows that once both  parameters are above 4, 
0 
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8 
W1 16 
2 W2 
1 
 
0.5 
the  MCAV for the  normal  processes is small. This 
implies an  effect on the  system,  which  further  in- 
vestigation will clarify. 
 
 
7.  Analysis 
 
In experiment M1 distinct differences are shown 
in the behaviour  of the algorithm  for the detection 
of normal and anomalous  processes. The MCAV for 
the anomalous  processes is significantly larger than 
the MCAV of the normal.  This is encouraging  as it 
shows that the  DCA can differentiate  between two 
Fig.  17. 3D surface plot  of varying weights  W1 and W2. Sshd 
process represented. 
 
different types of process based on environmentally 
derived  signals.  In experiment M2 the  PAMP  and 
danger signals  were switched.  In comparison  with 
the results presented  for experiment M1, the MCAV 
for the anomalous  process is not significantly differ- 
ent (paired t-test p < 0.01). However, in experiment 
M2, the  standard deviations  of the  mean  MCAVs 
are generally larger and is especially notable  for the 
nmap  process. Potentially, the two signals could be 
switched (through  accidental means or incorrect sig- 
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nal  selection)  without  altering  the performance  of 
the algorithm significantly. 
Experiment  M3 involved  reversing the  mapping 
of safe and PAMP  signals. The safe signal is gener- 
ated  continuously  when the  system  is inactive  and 
when mapped  as a PAMP  constantly generated full 
maturation in the artificial DCs, shown by the high 
MCAV value for all processes indiscriminately. In- 
terestingly, in M3 the  MCAV value  for the  anom- 
alous processes in the attack datasets is lower than 
the  normal  process’ value. For the  normal  dataset, 
all processes are classified as anomalous,  all result- 
ing in a MCAV of 1. Similar impeded  performance 
is shown for M6, caused  by the  incorrect  mapping 
of a PAMP  as a safe signal. The input PAMP  signal 
is strong, yet does not occur throughout. Therefore, 
not enough suppression  is present when the PAMP 
is mapped. 
M5 also produced interesting results - while it did 
not have such a marked effect on the anomalous pro- 
cesses, it produced high MCAVs for normal items in 
the  attack  dataset, but not  in the  normal  dataset. 
Under ‘normal’ scenarios this mapping  functions as 
the danger  signals are counter-balanced by the safe 
signals, resulting  in low MCAVs. As the PAMP  sig- 
nal is infrequent, insufficient signal to cause full mat- 
uration is present. 
The intended  signal mapping  produced good res- 
ults, showing that the DCA is capable of performing 
information fusion  and  anomaly  detection.   Chan- 
ging the mapping of signal meaning with data source 
has shown that the correct  mapping  is ideal. How- 
ever,  if the  PAMP   signal  is mapped  as  a  danger 
signal, performance  is not sacrificed. Alternatively, 
PAMPs  mapped  as safe signals produced  the worst 
results,  indicating that  care  must  be  taken  when 
selecting  a mechanism  of suppression.  These  data 
also suggest that suppression  is a key part  of the 
system, which supports parts  of Matzinger’s danger 
theory[19] in reference to peripheral tolerance. 
The parameters investigated in series-2 have little 
influence on the output of the system. For example, 
varying the DC antigen vector size does not produce 
any results  which are significantly  different in this 
respect.  Similar trends are shown for the number of 
receptors and the number of cells. Exceptions  to this 
include very low values of cells, storage  and recept- 
ors. The values originally used as default  paramet- 
ers have in many cases produced  the most consist- 
ent results.  This  is highlighted  in the  cell numbers 
experiments, DC antigen vector size and number of 
receptors.  This is no coincidence as these values, ini- 
tially  derived  from biological information[32],  and 
are designed to work together. This may account for 
some of the robustness seen with these parameters. 
Series-3  has  provided  valuable  insight  into  the 
behaviour  of the  DCA.  The  results  in Figures  14 
and 15 show that the DCA is insensitive to changes 
in  weights  within  the  signal  processing  equation, 
as little  variation is shown across the  spectrum  of 
values.  Significant  variation is evident  in  Figures 
16 and  17 suggesting  that incorrect  weight values 
may lead to increased  values of MCAV for normal 
processes. The relationship between the two values 
suggests  that higher values for the  weight produce 
lower MCAVs. One reason for this may be linked to 
the number  of update  cycles a cell performs.  W1 is 
the controlling weight for output signal o0 , which is 
matched  against  the DCs migration  thresholds. The 
sooner  this  threshold is exceeded,  the shorter  the 
time a cell spends sampling signals. For this partic- 
ular  dataset, using a threshold of 60 (+/- 50%), a 
W1 value of over 4 and W2 value of above 8 yields 
the  best result  in both  cases.  This  implies  that a 
tighter  temporal  coupling  between  signals and  an- 
tigen produces  lower MCAVs for normal  processes. 
To confirm this, a similar analysis will be performed 
using longer scans in future  work. 
 
 
8.  Conclusions and Future Work 
 
In this paper the DCA is described in detail  and 
interesting facets of the  algorithm   are  presented. 
The DCA  combines  inspiration from  the  immune 
system with principles of information  fusion to 
produce an  effective anomaly  detection  technique. 
The importance  of careful signal selection has been 
highlighted   through  signal  mapping   experiment. 
The DCA is somewhat  robust to misrepresentation 
of the  activating danger  and  PAMP   signals,  but 
care must  be taken  to select a suitable  safe signal 
as an indicator of normality. Incorrect  mapping  of 
safe signals  can  result  in impeded  performance  as 
shown with our results. 
The  algorithm  has  various  parameters,  and  it 
is shown  that the  DCA  is insensitive  to  changes 
in these  parameters. Provided  that the  values  are 
within   a  sensible  range,  the  algorithm  performs 
well  on  the task  of detecting   a  ping  based  port 
scan. Sensitivity analysis is also performed. The 
detection  of the  anomalous  processes  is robust to 
changes  in  the  signal  processing  weights,  though 
large variations  are shown in the incorrect detection 
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of normal processes. For the ping scan investigation, 
larger weights are preferable. This implies that bet- 
ter performance  is given if the time spent sampling 
signals by the DC is shorter. 
The  DCA is a new development in artificial  im- 
mune systems, and as yet has not been extensively 
tested.  Its  unique  methods  of combining  multiple 
signals and correlating  the combined  values with a 
separate antigen data-stream work well for the pur- 
pose of port scan detection. However, this makes the 
system difficult to compare, as other techniques can- 
not use data  of this type, such as standard machine 
learning  techniques  or signature  based  IDS.  Plus, 
individual  signals alone are insufficient to produce 
classification[10]. 
The  general  applicability of the algorithm to  a 
variety  of problems  is unexplored.  This  could  be 
initially  characterised through the  DCA’s applica- 
tion  to  a range  of portscans,  and  then  by  its  ap- 
plications  to  other  time-dependent datasets. This 
has thus far included applications within sensor net- 
works, as shown by Kim et al [16]. They  used the 
suggested  signal mapping  schema  as shown in sec- 
tion 5.6. 
Future  work with  the  algorithm  includes  its ap- 
plication  to SYN scan detection,  where we hope it 
will produce  competitive  solutions  with  other  port 
scan detectors.  Such experiment will require the use 
of multiple  signals  per  category,  with  a view to  a 
full implementation as a host based  port  scan de- 
tector.  The introduction of adaptive signals or vari- 
able weights may be necessary once multiple  signals 
per category  are used. Although  the relative weighs 
used  in the  signal  processing  equation  are  part of 
the  abstract model, some adaptive mechanism  for 
controlling the values of these weights may be bene- 
ficial to the sensitivity of the system. The algorithm 
may also be applied  to other  detection  or data  cor- 
relation problems such as the analysis of radio signal 
data from space, sensor networks, internet worm de- 
tection  and other security and defence applications. 
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